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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Hale challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained during a traffic stop. Mr. Hale argues the district court should have granted his motion
because Officer Sessions unlawfully extended the stop to verify Mr. Hale's permission to drive
the car. He also argues Officer Session did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop's
extension. The State responded. The State argues the district court properly denied the motion
because Officer Sessions did not unlawfully extend the stop and, in the alternative, he had
reasonable suspicion for the seizure. Mr. Hale replies to some, but not all, of the State's
arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hale's Appellant's Brief set forth the relevant facts and course of proceedings. (App.
Br., pp.1-6.) They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Hale's motion to suppress because Officer Sessions
unlawfully extended the traffic stop to verify Mr. Hale's permission to drive the car?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Hale's Motion To Suppress Because Officer Sessions
Unlawfully Extended The Traffic Stop To Verify Mr. Hale's Permission To Drive The Car
The primary issue on appeal is whether Officer Sessions' s extension of the traffic stop to
verify Mr. Hale's permission to drive his friend's car was an ordinary inquiry incident to the
stop. (See App. Br., pp.10-13.) Mr. Hale argues it was not. He asserts verification of the
non-owner's permission in this case went beyond the ordinary checks for license, registration,
and insurance because it grants officers the authority to detain drivers for any number of
subjective "verifications" outside the driver's control. (See App. Br., pp.12-13.) Absent
reasonable suspicion tied to the verification, Mr. Hale contends such extensions are unlawful and
contrary to the traffic stop limitations from Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
Recognizing there was no Idaho case law directly on point, the State relies on a
pre-Rodriguez opinion from the Fourth Circuit that allowed the officer to verify the driver's

permission as part of the traffic stop. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) That case, United States v. Branch,
537 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2008), is distinguishable in law and fact. From a legal standpoint, Branch
has limited value because it predates Rodriguez. After Rodriguez's directive that any "add[ed]
time" matters, 575 U.S. at 357, the Fourth Circuit certainly could have analyzed Branch
differently. Rodriguez requires an examination of discrete time intervals, even seconds, to
determine whether the officer unlawfully prolonged or extended that portion of the traffic stop.
575 U.S. at 357. The Branch court took a more holistic view, holding the officer was acting
either in furtherance of the stop's initial purpose and the misinformation provided by the
defendant or upon reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity. 537 F.3d at 337--40.
More importantly, the facts of Branch are in stark contrast to the facts here. In Branch,
the officer initiated a traffic stop after he saw the defendant (the driver) run a red light. Id. at 332,
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338. Before approaching the car, the officer learned from dispatch of a prior traffic incident with
this car and that the car had been in a "high volume drug trafficking" area. Id. at 332. The officer
approached the defendant and saw several air fresheners in the car. Id. The defendant and the
passenger did not make eye contact with the officer, and the defendant was "shaking" as he gave
the officer his license and registration. Id. During the officer's review of this information, the
officer obtained further confirmation of the defendant's involvement in drug-related activity. Id.
at 332-33. The officer also learned the car was not registered to the defendant or at the
defendant's address. Id. at 333. The officer confirmed the defendant's address and then requested
a drug dog. Id. While waiting for the dog, the officer learned the defendant was "well known" for
selling drugs. Id. The officer also discovered the car's registration and title were not "on file" in
the state database. Id. After this, the officer talked to the defendant again to ask about the car's
registration. Id. The defendant told the officer that his cousin owned the car and she gave him
permission to use it. Id. The officer asked to call to confirm this story, but the defendant said his
cousin was out of the country and unavailable. Id. The defendant did not make eye contact with
the officer during this interaction. Id. The officer determined from the cousin's mother that the
defendant was lying about his cousin being out of the country, and the cousin's mother told the
officer that the car should have been returned to the dealership. Id. The officer then called the
cousin, who said she gave the defendant permission to drive the car. Id. Shortly thereafter, the
dog alerted on the car. Id. at 333-34. After reviewing these facts, the Fourth Circuit determined
the officer's thirty-minute detention was "constitutional" because the officer was performing
routine duties or possessed reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity. Id. at 337, 339.
The factual distinctions between Branch and this case are threefold. First, the officer in
Branch already had reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity by the time the officer
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made inquiries with the cousin to verify the defendant's permission to drive the car. Id. at 339,
340. Here, Officer Sessions did not have independent reasonable suspicion of other criminal
activity to justify the seizure. (See R., pp.123 n.1, 126 n.3, 126-27.) Second, the defendant in
Branch did not disclose he was driving another person's car until the officer learned the car was

not registered to him. 537 F.3d at 333-34. Here, during Mr. Hale's first interaction with Officer
Sessions, Mr. Hale told the officer that the car was registered to Mr. KayKay. (R., p.124.) The
registration was valid, and the name and the car matched the registration. (Tr., p.53, Ls.6-24.)
Third, the Branch defendant was shaking and avoiding eye contact with the officer during the
encounter. 537 F.3d at 333. The evidence here shows Mr. Hale was cooperative and
forthcoming. (See generally State's Ex. 2, Video 1, 0:31-2:28.) In all, the officer in Branch was
"entitled to detain [the defendant] in order to issue him a citation and confirm that he was
permitted to drive the [car]." 537 F.3d at 338. The officer had reasonable suspicion of other
criminal activity, the defendant was evasive, and any attempt to verify the car's registration
created further suspicion. None of these facts was present here. Contrary to the State's assertion,
Branch is not only of minimal legal significance, but also factually dissimilar from this case.

The State also contends Mr. Hale "wrongly" argues an officer's verification of a
non-owner driver grants the police too much authority to further detain drivers for subjective,
non-ordinary inquires. (Resp. Br., p.10.) The State submits this is a "distinction without a
difference" because an officer can always "decide[ ] to conduct other ordinary inquiries incident
to the traffic stop ... beyond the driver's control." (Resp. Br., p.10.) That is the problem.
According to the State's position, an officer can prolong or extend a traffic stop for any so-called
ordinary inquiry subjectively decided by the officer. Yet officers do not have carte blanche
during traffic stops. Rodriguez made that clear. An officer can conduct routine checks for
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license, registration, insurance, and the like, but anything further requires reasonable suspicion to
justify the seizure. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 357. Officer Sessions's verification did not fit
within an ordinary inquiry incident to the stop.
Finally, the State contends any extension to verify Mr. Hale's permission was justified by
reasonable suspicion of joyriding. (Resp. Br., pp.10-14.) Mr. Hale again notes the district court
alluded to a determination that there was not reasonable suspicion, but merely "skepticism," i.e.,
a hunch, of "joyriding or auto theft." (R., p.127; see also App. Br., p.15 n.7.) That being said, the
State has not established Officer Sessions had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
warrant the seizure. The State relies on two facts: the Boise-Garden City address discrepancy and
Mr. Hale's pre-stop conduct. (Resp. Br., pp.12-14.) On the former, the State's argument is
unremarkable, and Mr. Hale respectfully refers this Court to his Appellant's Brief. (App.
Br., pp.14-15.) On the latter, the State's argument places far too much weight on conduct that
the district court and even Officer Sessions found insignificant. The district court noted Officer
Sessions "identified" loitering "as a reason for the stop," but he "never returned to that concern
later in the stop." (R., p.123 n.1.) The district court found Officer Sessions spent no
"meaningful" time on this loitering purpose throughout the stop, "and it need not be discussed
further." (R., p.123 n.1.) Thus, Officer Sessions, almost immediately, abandoned this alleged
purpose of the stop. And the district court found no reason to factor it into its analysis. Therefore,
this pre-stop conduct does not tip the scales in favor of reasonable suspicion of joyriding. The
totality of the circumstances, including Mr. Hale's inability to give Officer Sessions the exact
address for his friend's car registration, did not give rise to reasonable suspicion of any criminal
activity to justify the extension. Mr. Hale submits the State's alternative argument of Officer
Sessions' s reasonable suspicion of joyriding is unpersuasive.
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For of all these reasons, and those stated in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hale maintains the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the unlawfully
extended traffic stop.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hale respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying his
motion to suppress, vacate the district court's judgment of conviction, and remand his case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 20 th day of February, 2020.

Isl Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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